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Remarks of Ambassador Luis Gallegos and Dean Claudio Grossman*
Ambassador Gallegos

T

hank you for this invitation to the law school, it is an
honor to be here.

I will be touching on a few elements
which I think pertain to the experience of the Committee
on this issue. First of all, of course, we are talking about normative incorporation, and we can see in the convention, Articles
1 through 15, all of them have issues of incorporation. I’d like
to present you with various scenarios. One of them of course is
that a state incorporates, but just as we have just heard from the
Special Rapporteur, the majority of 125 countries have not, or
are unwilling to, or don’t, criminalize this as much as we would
wish. Some of them have done it partially which I would call
the second category. Incomplete incorporation means that it is
not within their constitutional framework, it is in their secondary
law or procedural law, or it might not even be in any of those.
We have experience of many countries coming to us to report
that they are in the process, which could be the third category,
those in progress, and there are of course those who simply
do not have them in their legal framework although they have
signed the Convention. We have 125 states that have signed the
convention, that means about 78% of the 192 states that form
the UN. The guidelines that the committee has had since 1991
are, fundamentally, to ask the countries to incorporate, and it
is recommended that they do incorporate. So every time the
Committee sits down to review a state’s compliance, they are
asked to analyze and explain why they haven’t incorporated. I
think that the Rapporteurs are very insistent on the procedure as
to why they have not incorporated this into their legal framework. The actual issue also has to do with jurisdiction. I do think
we are talking about the basis of what we would call the political
willingness. Are states willing to do this?
Of course you have to have a principle for states to sign a
treaty and have their parliaments ratify it. But are they willing,
do they have the political will, to do this? Most of the states of
the world do not like to be monitored by international organizations or international conventions, which set up a body of
experts.
In a few days is the first meeting of the human rights
Convention on Persons with Disabilities, which is a step in the
right direction. As we have these treaty bodies which comply
with the enforceable obligations of states, the states have signed
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them and ratified them and now they have to comply with them
. . . but I would say that many don’t. If we wish to look into
this further, the progress of the Committee, you will find that
the number of countries that have not even presented their first
reports . . . I would say that there are 38 countries which have
not presented their initial reports. Fifty-six haven’t presented
their 2nd, and so on. So if you add up the numbers, a large number of countries are not reporting.
The problem is that we have a major backlog, so the
Secretariat is backlogged, and so is the Committee. We have
something like reports of 40 countries that we haven’t been
able to deal with in the Committee Against Torture, and maybe
someone can give us a more precise number on that, but the
Committee is going to have to duplicate its sessions to deal with
these issues, and not only duplicate them but be more efficient,
which is another issue of how the committees that monitor these
conventions are not operating in an effective sense.
If someone is tortured today, by the time the Committee
meets to deal with this, it might take years. We need a more
effective system of monitoring, we need a more effective system
of having states comply with their international obligations. Of
course, you have to also be very proactive. Let me divide this
into three aspects. One is technical assistance; I do think that
the Committee has to have the capacity to give states technical
assistance for the compliance to the convention. I am not talking
about prevention. I think that is a very valuable step, but I think
the actual problem is that we have torture. And as the Special
Rapporteurs just said, it is generalized and systematic and we are
not getting to the roots of how to eliminate it.
As I just confessed to you, I am a lawyer, but I do not believe
that the majority of problems can be solved by law, there also
must be a change in society. We have to change how society
views this in its interior essence. And that is the change we are
looking for. In the realm of human rights we need a revolutionary proposal, to change societies. You have to change the way
an individual looks at it, a family looks at it, and society looks
at it. I think we also need to have a conscious building effort in
the world.
We were talking about issues of how torture and other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatments and punishments have been
dealt with in the last few years, especially in the context of terrorism, and let me just say that as a practitioner, I have found
that governments have had verbal agreements on intelligence,
which I find very disturbing. I do not condone the ability of
intelligence services to have verbal agreements.
The accountability of democracy, and of civil authorities
democratically elected to overview the procedures under which
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their police forces and military forces are working, is key.
Coming from Latin America, and I think Claudio will agree
with me, they have been subject to dictatorships which have had
a very long span of activities, so we need to enforce a procedure
to subject the military and police to civilian oversight.
Having shared time with the Dean, I’d like to conclude with
three major issues:
• First of all, we need to promote the political will of states
parties. And the only way a state party does this is if civil
society, NGOs, and political institutions prompt it to do so.
If we don’t have that, a state won’t move in the right direction. This can be done in a democratic system; the majority
of countries in the world, I hope, are or will be democracies, but everyone has its particularity. This is something
that we should work on diligently.
• Second, we need the financial and human resources in
order for these committees to address this adequately and
so that commissions in their own territorial states can do
this. So as we broaden the aspect of individual commissions to deal with this in the individual territories or under
universal jurisdiction, we have to be able to prompt them
and we have to be able to define the issues of what we are
dealing with when we talk about torture, when we talk
about cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as a vision
of societies, as a vision of how societies comply with
their obligations. We have to try to do something that is
very difficult, and that is what most impressed me from
President Obama – we must have transparency. Can we get
true government transparency, do we have the capability of
having agreements that are negotiated and signed that are
not under the board, that are not capable of rendition, or
jails flying in the skies, or having the capability of looking at this through democratically framed institutions? If
we are capable of that, I think the committees can work
better.
• Third, in the solving the backlog of this Committee, the
only way we can do this is to stress the compliance of
countries and to accompany civil societies in this effort.

Claudio Grossman

Taking into account the nonreciprocal nature of state obligations under human rights treaties, horizontal supervision is not
the best-suited mechanism for ensuring compliance. Moreover,
state supervision – of compliance with human rights norms – by
other states often does not take place absent other state interests
(e.g., security, political, etc.). As a result, action is not guaranteed and, when it does take place, it is open to criticism aimed at
questioning its legitimacy.
In light of the pitfalls of horizontal supervision, the international community created collective systems of supervision:
political; semi-judicial (which combines judicial with political elements); and judicial (that resembles the judiciary in a
domestic setting). The political supervision (e.g., the General
Assemblies of the United Nations and of the Organization of
American States) allows for recordkeeping and public debate
that on occasion can limit the discretion of states when they fail
to react to human rights violations. However, collective political
supervision ultimately depends on a calculated political interest
and lacks the legitimacy accruing to action based on the rule of
law as determined by independent third parties. As such, the
semi-judicial and judicial forms of supervision are preferable
from the perspective of legitimacy, particularly when composed
of organs with independent and qualified experts, and where
individuals have rights of action to present petitions alleging
human rights violations. While there are meaningful developments and improvements in the area of international supervision, particularly at the regional level, this process is still under
development, thereby reinforcing the need to simultaneously

Dean Grossman
Domestic

incorporation of international treaty obliga-

tions is essential.

First, there are “technical” reasons which
explain this importance, namely, that the traditional supervisory
mechanisms established by classic international law are weak.
In fact, under classic international law, as the International
Court of Justice has stated, treaties typically establish reciprocal
obligations among state parties that allow one of the “aggrieved”
states to depart from its own obligations when the other state is
in non-compliance. This type of state supervision – “horizontal
supervision” – was the sole mechanism for supervising compliance with treaties during the classic period of international law.
Human rights treaties, because of their humanitarian purpose,
establish nonreciprocal obligations among states. Accordingly,
violations by one state are not considered acceptable grounds
for derogation, in turn, by other states from their own human
rights obligations.
13
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focus on the importance of incorporating international human
rights obligations into the domestic realm.
While we pursue domestic incorporation, we should also
recognize the need to promote the transformation of classic
international law principles that consider the matter of incorporation a purely domestic issue typically to be decided by the
constitutional norms of each state. Again, states under inter
national law were free to decide whether a special act of incorporation, e.g., a statute, was required, or whether international
norms would be applied directly – either by sheer ratification of
a treaty or by considering customary law applicable in certain
circumstances. Human rights obligations such as the prohibition
against torture, summary executions and genocide, created a
different type of obligation than those typically existing under
classic international law. To take the law seriously requires,
at a certain point, transforming classic international law with
regard to these types of obligations so that their application in
the domestic setting becomes a matter of international law and
is not left to state discretion. Needless to say, this process of
grounding such obligations in international law will not happen
overnight; but what is ultimately at stake here, is the legitimacy
of international law itself and, perhaps, of law in general. In fact,
if a state declares that it will not torture and ratifies a treaty to
that effect, the very same concept of law deteriorates if the state
is then permitted to claim that while violation of the prohibition of torture may generate international responsibility, such
prohibition cannot be enforced in the domestic legal system.
Hence, a dual-pronged approach – strengthening international
supervision and the domestic incorporation of international
obligations – should continue while the transformation of classic
international law itself is presented as a vital aspect of achieving
compliance with human rights norms.
As to the means currently available to achieving domestic
incorporation of international law, two positive case examples
from the United States provide interesting comparative material. One is the trial of Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr., the son of
former Liberian president Charles Taylor, Sr. Initially detained
and convicted on charges of passport fraud in March of 2006,
Chuckie Taylor was eventually charged with torture – after U.S.
investigations, prompted in part by human rights groups such as
Human Rights Watch – for his conduct in Liberia while head of
the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), an elite pro-government military
unit established by his father, Charles Taylor, Sr., shortly after

taking office. A November 2007 indictment charged Chuckie
Taylor with five counts of torture, one count of conspiracy to
torture, one count of using a firearm during a violent crime, and
one count of conspiracy to use a firearm during a violent crime.
The conduct charged included committing forms of torture such
as burning victims with molten plastic, lit cigarettes, scalding
water, candle wax and an iron; severely beating victims with
firearms; cutting and stabbing victims; and shocking victims
with an electric device.1
Taylor was tried in the United States under the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), the first ever prosecution on
torture charges under that statute. He was recently sentenced
by U.S. District Court Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga to 97 years
in prison for crimes involving torture in Liberia between April
1999 and July 2003.2 In this case, the conviction was the result
of an explicit normative instrument – the TVPA – that allows
the domestic judiciary to act and enforce international treaty
obligations.
Similarly, it is important to mention the landmark Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala case, which set a precedent for imposing civil
tort liability upon non-citizens in the United States for violation of the law of nations.3 The Filártiga decision was adopted
under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, also known as the Alien
Tort Claims Act, which allows a non-citizen to sue another
non-citizen only for a tort committed in violation of the law
of nations. In Filártiga, two Paraguayan citizens (a father and
daughter) sued a Paraguayan government official for the act of
torturing, in Paraguay, a relative (their son and brother, respectively), upon their learning of that official’s presence in the U.S.
on a visa that had since expired. Under the Alien Tort Statute, a
U.S. court ordered that damages in the amount of $10.3 million
be paid to the plaintiffs.4 A body of jurisprudence developed
following this case that explicitly recognized that official torture
and comparable universal offenses constitute violations not only
of international law, but also of U.S. federal common law.5
These two cases illustrate that in the United States, as in
other countries, there are normative possibilities for incorporation of international human rights law into the domestic realm.
Expansion of these possibilities will contribute to the achievement of the more ambitious goal, namely, the transformation of
classic international law so that human rights obligations will
always be enforceable, both domestically and internationally, on
the basis of international law itself. 		
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Endnotes: Domestic Incorporation of Obligations under the Convention against Torture
1

Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release, ROY BELFAST
JR., AKA CHUCKIE TAYLOR, CONVICTED ON TORTURE
CHARGES, October 20, 2008.
2 Department of Justice Press Release, January 9, 2009.
3 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996) (reaffirming Filártiga by stating that the court “ha[s] neither the authority
nor the inclination to retreat from that ruling”). In Filártiga and its
progeny, numerous federal courts construed the Alien Tort Statute/

Alien Tort Claims Act to permit aliens to sue foreign officials for
acts of torture, summary execution, disappearance, and similar
universal crimes committed under color of state law. For analysis
and discussion of the leading cases, see Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (1991)
and the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication
of International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 539 (1997) (analyzing ATS/ATCA
decisions).
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